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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Order of the Utah Supreme Court this matter was
poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals on May 25, 1993.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant failed to comply with Rule 24(b)(5) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure by failing to provide the applicable
standard of review and supporting authority for each issue she
seeks to appeal.

For the Court's benefit the following standards

of review apply to each issue as framed by appellant:
1.

The standard of review pertaining to summary judgments

has been clearly stated.

Summary judgments present for review

conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments
do not resolve factual issues.

Gridley Assoc., Ltd. v. Trans-

america Ins. Co. , 828 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah App. 1992); Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc. , 789 P.2d 24, 25
(Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).

This

court should afford no deference to the trial court, but review its
conclusions for correctness only.
Co. , 844 P.2d

366, 368

Goetz v. American Reliable Ins.

(Utah App. 1992); Allen v.

Prudential

Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992).
2.

"The trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny a

motion for a new trial . . . ."

Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170,

173 (Utah 1983) ; see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d
789

(Utah 1991); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982);

Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988 (Utah 1982); Chournos
1

v. D'Aqnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d
1008 (Utah 1973); Uptown Appliance & Radio Co, v. Flint, 249 P.2d
82 6 (Utah 1952).

An order granting or denying a motion for a new

trial will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion by
the trial judge.

See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789

(Utah 1991) ; Bar son by & Through Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730
(Utah 1982); Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d
99 (Utah 1981).
3.

Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that no one is entitled to relief from an order or judgment due to
an error in the judicial proceedings unless the error is harmful.
Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1991);
Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 1981).

An error

is harmful when there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome of the proceedings."

State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d

116, 120 (Utah 1989).
4.

Under Rule 52, an appellate court will defer to the

decision of the trial court unless the trial court's decision was
"clearly erroneous."

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P. 2d

896 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989);
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987).

A finding is

clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of evidence or
if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a
mistake has been made.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987);
2

Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988); Southland Corp,
v. Potter. 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The determinative statute in resolving this appeal is Utah
Code

Ann. §

31A-22-309

(1991),

"Limitations,

Exclusions, and

Conditions to Personal Injury Protection." The relevant statute is
set forth in the addendum to appellants brief.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil suit for money damages arising out of an
automobile

accident

between

the plaintiff

Tomasa

Lidia

("plaintiff") and the defendant Gary Nelson ("defendant").

Vigil
The

automobile accident occurred on October 8, 1987, at 5300 South 320
West, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Plaintiff claims that the accident

caused her injuries and related damages.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Plaintiff filed her complaint in the Third District Court on
September 19, 1991. Discovery proceeded through November 13, 1992,
at which time defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's
complaint due to her failure to meet the statutory
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09.

threshold

On December 2, 1992,

Judge David S. Young ("Judge Young") issued a minute entry granting
defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had not
met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309.
Judge Young entered an Order of Dismissal on December 11, 1992.
3

On December 17, 1992, plaintiff filed a Motion for Amendment
of Order or New Trial and Request for Oral Argument,

On February

1, 1993, Judge Young issued a minute entry denying plaintiff's
Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial and Request for Oral
Argument, Judge Young entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion
for Amendment of Order or New Trial and Oral Argument on February
16, 1993.
C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Defendant and plaintiff were involved in an automobile

accident on October 8, 1987.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the

Third District Court on September 19, 1991, seeking damages as a
result of the automobile accident.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges

that she suffered "permanent partial disability" and that she has
incurred medical expenses "in an amount to exceed $3,000.00."
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-5, hereinafter referred to as "RA").
2. Throughout discovery plaintiff failed to produce evidence
that

she

incurred

medical

expenses

in

an

amount

exceeding

$3,000.00. An examination of plaintiff's responses to Defendant's
First

Set

of

Interrogatories

and

Request

for

Production

of

Documents, filed February 25, 1992, evidences this fact.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants First Set of Interrogatories
Answer to Interrogatory No. 8:
Plaintiff has supplied, as attachment "A", the only
itemization of expenses for her injuries incident to the
occurrence presently available.
Plaintiff is in the
process of requesting and obtaining additional copies of
expense charges to corroborate her earlier pleading
4

estimate and will make those available to defendant as
soon as received. Plaintiff did not use any medical
device or appliance related to her injuries following and
stemming from the occurrence and believes that other drug
expenses were for initial pain pills which she discontinued in early 1988 and which amount should be in the
range of approximately $100.00. (RA, p. 48)
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Request for Production of
Documents
Request No. 1: All invoices, statements, receipts, bills
or other documentation from any hospitals, doctors,
physical therapists or other persons or institutions
practicing the healing arts and sciences relating to the
treatment of any injury or condition allegedly sustained
by plaintiff as a result of the incident complained in
plaintiff's complaint.
Response: Plaintiff has produced and attached as Exhibit
"A" to the concurrently filed Answers to Interrogatories
all present medical invoices or statements which she has.
Plaintiff is presently obtaining and gathering additional
statements and invoices and will make those available in
response to this request as soon as received. Plaintiff
also anticipates a further medical examination and treatment for which she will supply copies of invoices and
billing statements. (RA, p. 35)
Attachment A to plaintiff's discovery responses is a copy of
a medical bill from St. Mark's Hospital in the amount of $190.00.
(RA, p. 39)

No other medical bills or documents have been sub-

mitted to support plaintiff's alleged $3,000.00 medical expenses.
3.

Plaintiff was referred by her attorney to Dr. J. Mark

McGlothlin for a medical examination on March 30, 1992.

Dr.

McGlothlin prepared an initial report dated March 30, 1992, setting
forth his findings.

Dr. McGlothlin also prepared an addendum

report dated September 21, 1992.

5

Neither report states that the

automobile accident caused plaintiff "permanent partial disability"
as alleged in her complaint.1

(RA# pp. 55-67)

4. Dr. McGlothlin's deposition was taken on November 9, 1992.
Dr. McGlothlin testified that because of several holes in the data
base he was unwilling and unable to specify what percentage, if
any, of plaintiff's complaints were attributable to the automobile
accident or were a result of pre-existing degenerative conditions.
Specifically, Dr. McGlothlin testified:
Q. Are you saying at least one-third of her
expressed subjective as well as objective
findings and range of motion, et cetera, are
apportioned to pre-existing? Does that mean
the other two-thirds are the accident, or what
are you saying here?
A. Two issues that are pertinent there. One
is — probably the most critical issue is that
when I saw her in March, and let's go back to
starting on page nine of that report, in my
opinion to really nail down what is going on
with this lady there is a series of things
that needed to be, and probably still need to
be, done. And this is where I think — this
is where I'm on thin ice and this is where I'm
going to waffle with you a little bit because
I don't know what all that left arm stuff is.
I don't know if that's cardiac disease, if
that's symptom exaggeration, or if it's subtle
nerve irritation from tight muscles in her
neck area, lack of thoracic outlet syndrome.
So we have still got some data base
holes, one being has this gal got a sick heart
with an atypical chest pain syndrome, which
would be the worse [sic] thing she could have,

l

A copy of the March 30, 1992, and supplemental September 21,
1992, reports prepared by Dr. McGlothlin were attached as Exhibit
B to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff took no exception to the reports and adopted them as
proper exhibits before the trial court. (RA, p. 71)
6

obviously. And I'm no cardiologist and would
never testify as an expert, but I don't think
that would be an accident relevant issue. I
think that would be other things.
On page 10 under subparagraph B, I
mentioned that we have really got to be able
to put together
ideally
a series of
radiographs that help us objectify change. We
have been talking about that. Obviously, we
have some holes there.
Subparagraph C, also on page 10, I
projected at that time if we had a hard time
rounding up appropriate data, we may need more
specific and detailed radiographic data. . . .
I think one of those, either of those studies
would be helpful at this point. . . . I think
an EMG would be useful.
(Deposition of Dr. Mark McGlothlin, pp.52-54,
RA, pp. 95-97)
5.

Subsequent to Dr. McGlothlin's deposition, plaintiff

submitted an Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin, dated November 10, 1992.
Defendant opposed the Court's consideration of the affidavit
because the affidavit contradicted Dr. McGlothlin's prior deposition testimony. (RA, pp. 77-81)
6.

On December 11, 1992, Judge Young entered an Order of

Dismissal.

Judge Young granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss on

the grounds that the matter failed to reach the threshold level
required in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. (RA, pp. 106-07)
7.

On December 16, 1992, plaintiff filed a Motion for

Amendment of Order or New Trial.

(RA, pp. 112-13)

In the motion

plaintiff requested Judge Young to "amend by rescinding its prior
Order of Dismissal." (RA, p. 112)
8.

In conjunction with plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of

Order or New Trial, plaintiff submitted an affidavit in "opposition
7

to defendant's Motion to Dismiss because she was out of the jurisdiction and could not earlier respond." (RA, p.124)

Defendant

asked the Court to strike plaintiff's affidavit from the record on
the grounds that the affidavit contained testimony that would not
be admissible if testified to at trial. (RA, p. 157).
9. On February 16, 1993, Judge Young entered an Order denying
plaintiff's Motion for "Amendment of Order or New Trial" and
Request for Oral Argument on the same. (RA, pp. 181-82)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court applied the proper standard of care in
dismissing plaintiff's complaint due to her failure to meet the
threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309.

More than

five years after the subject accident, plaintiff failed to provide
any credible evidence that she suffered a "permanent partial
disability."

Additionally, plaintiff admitted that she had only

incurred $190.00 in medical expenses during the five years after
the accident.
The trial court also did not err in refusing to reconsider its
prior dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff failed to meet
the requirements for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) and (7).
Plaintiff failed to address how the evidence was insufficient to
justify dismissal of this action or that the dismissal was an error
in law.

Additionally, plaintiff's motion for new trial was

properly dismissed because it was nothing more than a motion to
reconsider which is not allowed under the Utah Rules of Civil
8

Procedure. There was no abuse of discretion which could lead this
court to overturn the trial court7s ruling.
Failure of the trial court to grant plaintiff's request for
oral argument on her Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial is
not grounds for reversal of the trial court's ruling.

Under Rule

4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the trial court
can exercise discretion in denying a request for hearing when it
finds that one of the two enumerated exceptions have been met: (1)
the motion is frivolous or (2) the dispositive issue has been
authoritatively decided.

Rule 4-501 does not require the trial

court to indicate in its memorandum decision the grounds for its
denial of oral argument.

As such the trial court did not commit

reversible error in denying plaintiff's request for oral argument.
The trial court was also not compelled to offer a written
statement for the grounds for its decision under Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The requirement to provide a

written statement pursuant to Rule 52(a) arises only when the
motion is based on "more than one ground."

Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss plaintiff's complaint was based on only one ground, failure
to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309.
As such, the trial court was not required to provide a written
statement as to its decision.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OP CARE
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE
Defendant does not dispute that once matters outside the
pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss that the matter
turns into a motion for summary judgment.

However, under either

standard, plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed due to her
failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09.

Plaintiff

admitted that she had not incurred medical expenses sufficient to
meet the $3,000.00 threshold requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-309.

Additionally, plaintiff failed to provide any credible

evidence that she suffered a "permanent partial disability" arising
out of the subject automobile accident as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-309. No issue of material fact existed on either of
these requirements making the trial court's ruling proper.
The standard of review pertaining to summary judgments has
been

clearly

stated.

Summary

judgments

present

for

review

conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments
do not resolve factual issues.

Gridley Assoc., Ltd. v. Trans-

america Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah App. 1992); Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25
(Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).
Thus, this court should afford no deference to the trial court, but
review its conclusions for correctness only.

10

Goetz v. American

Reliable Ins, Co. , 844 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah App. 1992); Allen v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992).
It was entirely within the province of the trial court to
summarily dispose of the instant action.

"[I]t is well settled

that the court may not permit the jury to speculate upon the
evidence and that a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise,
conjecture, guess, or speculation."

Olsen v. Warwood, 255 P. 2d

725, 727 (Utah 1953); Jackson v. Colston, 209 P.2d 566 (Utah 1949);
Pern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co., 75 P.2d 660 (Utah 1938).
Pursuant to Rule 3.3

of the Utah Rules of Professional

Conduct, counsel for defendant believes that she has a duty to
advise this Court of legal authority not disclosed in appellant's
brief.

Subsequent to the lower court's ruling on defendant's

Motion to Dismiss and prior to its ruling on plaintiff's Motion for
Amendment of Order or New Trial, this Court addressed the monetary
threshold requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09 in Jepson v.
State Department of Corrections, 846 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1993). In
Jepson this Court found that the plaintiff could have filed suit
prior to incurring $3,000.00 in medical expenses "so long as his
expenses exceeded the statutory minimum at time of trial." Jd. at
488.

Jepson, however, is distinguishable and does not govern the

resolution in this case.
Jepson is factually distinguishable from this case in many key
respects.

In Jepson, plaintiff contended on appeal that the trial

court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment on
11

the basis of its conclusion that plaintiffs claim arose at the
time of the accident, and thus Jepson did not timely file his
notice of claim within one year after the claim arose pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989).
In Jepson, the automobile collision causing the plaintiff's
injuries occurred on November 14, 1986.

On December 8, 1987, the

plaintiff met the statutory threshold of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22309

when

his

medical

bills

exceeded

$3,000.00.

However,

plaintiff's claim, filed on November 23, 1988, was barred by the
one-year statute of limitations.

In any event, only one year and

24 days had lapsed between the time of the injury and meeting the
threshold requirements under the statute. Had plaintiff filed his
claim in a timely manner, he unquestionably would have met this
threshold by the time of trial.
In Jepson, this court relied on Cappadona v. Eckelmann, 388
A.2d
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(N.J. 1978).

In Cappadona, the plaintiff

suffered

injuries from an automobile accident on February 1, 1975. On March
19, 1975, the plaintiff met the statutory threshold requirement of
$200.00 in medical expenses. Again, the plaintiffs claim was not
timely filed and subsequently barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. However, it was only one month and 18 days before the
plaintiff was able to meet this nominal statutory requirement.
Similarly, in Carter v. Cross, 373 So.2d 81 (Fla. App. 1979),
cited on page 47 of this Courts opinion in Jepson, the plaintiff
sustained personal injuries from an automobile accident on March 8,
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1974.

On June 3, 1974, plaintiff met the statutory threshold

requirement by ascertaining that her injury was permanent. The
Florida Court of Appeals found that the action was also barred by
the running of the statute of limitations.

In Carter, only two

months and 26 days had passed before the plaintiff had met the
statutory threshold.
In Cappadona and Carter, the statutory threshold was met long
before the running of the statute of limitations.

In Jepson, the

threshold was met within days after the running of the short one
year statute of limitations. There is no question in any of these
cases that if the plaintiffs7 claims had been timely filed, that
they would have met their statutory threshold well before trial.
However, in the instant action, it is highly unlikely that
plaintiff

could

meet

the

statutory

threshold

before

trial.

Plaintiff's injury occurred on October 8, 1987. By the time of the
filing of this case, September 19, 1991, nearly four years later,
the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 09 had not
yet been met. Moreover, by the time this case was dismissed by the
trial court on February 16, 1993, there was still no credible
evidence that plaintiff had met the statutory requirements.

In

fact, in the five and a half years since the plaintiff's initial
injury, she can only account for $190.00 in medical expenses and is
unable to present any conclusive evidence as to a permanent partial
disability.
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Additionally, if this case were permitted to go to trial, at
least six years would have lapsed from the time the cause of action
arose.

It remains doubtful

that

in the

forthcoming months

plaintiff will be able to meet the necessary requirements to
maintain her action.

In fact, it seems more probable that the

plaintiff will attempt to delay trial until she either accumulates
the $3,000.00 minimum medical expenses or finds a medical provider
to testify as to a permanent partial disability.
Given the factual scenario in the instant action, it would be
highly prejudicial to allow plaintiff to reach the no-fault threshold anytime after the filing of the complaint, so long as it
occurs before trial. In essence a plaintiff would have any number
of years to meet threshold, so long as a complaint was filed prior
to

the

statute

of

limitations.

The

strong

policy

reasons

enunciated by this Court in Jepson are clearly contrary to such a
result.
As this Court recognized in Jepson there is a compelling
institutional need in this day and age of congested court calendars
to set an ascertainable end to the resolution of tort actions. If
this Court were to allow plaintiff over five years to meet the
statutory threshold requirements it would introduce considerable
uncertainty into the law as well as unduly prolong resolution of
this and similar actions.

Also, insurance carriers would need to

set aside vast open-ended reserves until such time as persons
either accumulate medical expenses in the amount of $3,000.00 or
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find an expert who will testify that their injuries constitute a
"permanent disability,"

Such an interpretation would fly in the

face of the underlying purpose and intent of the No-Fault Statute.
As such, given the factual scenario in the instant action, Jepson
does not require this Court to reverse the lower courts dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed because she
failed to present any credible evidence that she sustained a
"permanent disability" or injury nearly five years after the
accident and due to her failure to reach $3,000.00 in medical
expenses. Plaintiff admitted in discovery responses that the only
medical expense she had incurred was a bill in the amount of
$190.00 from St. Mark's Hospital. The trial court did not have any
other evidence that plaintiff had met the $3,000.00 threshold.
The trial court also did not have any credible evidence that
plaintiff sustained a "permanent disability" or injury.

Dr.

McGlothlin testified in his deposition that several holes existed
in the data base and he was unwilling and unable to specify what
percentage,

if

any,

of

plaintiff's

present

complaints

were

attributable to the automobile accident or pre-existing degenerative conditions.

Dr. McGlothlin did not state in his deposition

with any certainty that plaintiff

incurred permanent partial

disabilities as a direct and proximate result of the accident on
October 8, 1987. The doctor testified that there is a "reasonable
probability a portion of her complaints are attributable to the
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accident," but he never testified that plaintiff suffered from a
"permanent partial disability" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-309.
Additionally, prior to his deposition, Dr. McGlothlin issued
two reports outlining his findings upon examination of plaintiff in
March of 1992. Notably, neither of Dr. McGlothlin's reports state
that plaintiff suffered a permanent partial disability as a result
of the accident.

Over five years after the subject accident,

plaintiff failed to present any credible evidence establishing that
she had met the statutory threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-309.

As such, no issue of fact existed and the trial

court was correct in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
The trial court also properly rejected

Dr. McGlothlin's

subsequent affidavit. Utah law provides that a party may not rely
on a subsequent affidavit that contradicts deposition testimony to
create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment unless
there is some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony
was in error or the party-deponent is able to state in the
affidavit an adequate explanation for the contradictory answer in
the deposition.

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983);

Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Utah 1988);
Floyd v. Western Surgical Assoc. , 773, P.2d 401, 403 (Utah App.
1989); Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1322
(Utah App. 1991).
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Dr. McGlothlin's affidavit is not in accord with his deposition testimony.

In his deposition, Dr. McGlothlin was unable to

state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that plaintiff
suffered a permanent partial disability. Dr. McGlothlin testified
that because of several holes in the data base that he was
unwilling and unable to specify what percentage, if any, of
plaintiff's complaints were attributable to the automobile accident
or pre-existing degenerative conditions.

However, Dr. McGlothlin

stated in his affidavit that "to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty" plaintiff suffered "some degree of permanent partial
disability" and that some portion of that is the direct result of
the automobile accident of October 8, 1987.
Dr. McGlothlin failed to state in his affidavit an adequate
explanation for the contradictory answer in his deposition.

Dr.

McGlothlin did not state in his subsequent affidavit that his prior
deposition

testimony was

in error.

For these reasons, Dr.

McGlothlin's affidavit did not create an issue of fact and should
not have been considered by the trial court.
Lastly, plaintiff's affidavit submitted in conjunction with
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial did not
create an issue of fact which would have precluded the lower court
from granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Rule 701 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert,
the witness' testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or
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inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.
It is also clearly stated that an opinion on an ultimate issue is
reserved for expert witness testimony.

UTAH

R.

EVID.

704.

In the lower court proceedings plaintiff fully recognized and
agreed with the legal standard that a lay person cannot act as
their own professional witness in giving ultimate medical opinions
as to medical matters beyond the scope of the lay person. (RA, p.
126) Testimony from a lay person is strictly limited to opinions
based on the perception of the witness.
While a lay witness may not give expert testimony as to his or
her physical condition, he or she may state simple inferences drawn
from his or her conscious subjective sensations concerning such
condition.

32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546(22). See Ricrains v. Bechtel

Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. App. 1986) (injured person
may testify

as to her past and present condition) ; Bitzan v.

Parisi, 558 P. 2d 775, 778 (Wash. 1977) (laymen may testify to their
sensory perceptions); Rowe v. Maule Drug Co. , 413 P.2d 104, 110
(Kan.

1966)

permissible).

(lay testimony

to

obvious

facts

and

observations

These cases emphasize that the type of testimony

which may be rendered by a lay person includes such perceptions as
pain, suffering, limitation of motion, loss of vision, joint stiffness, and the like. The witness is confined to statements relating
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to the outward

appearance of his or her

symptoms experienced by him or her.

injuries and to the

32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546(22).

A witness, however, is not permitted to testify as to duration
of disability

or pain that may have resulted

from

an

sustained by him or her as to future pain and suffering.

injury

Id.

See

Cain v. Stevenson, 706 P.2d 128, 131 (Mont. 1985) (citing Zeoman v.
State, 416 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (1979) (lay testimony insufficient to
establish either the permanency of the injury or the possibility of
future pain).
cannot know
necessary.

Where an injury is subjective and a lay person

if it will

continue, expert medical testimony

is

Cain, 706 P. 2d at 131, (citing Coryell v. Conn, 276

N.W.2d 723 (1979).
In Cain, a subcontractor received an award of damages for back
injuries received while working

for an electrical

contractor.

During the trial, the subcontractor testified as to his past and
present condition.

The court held that this was sufficient to

prove injury, but was not sufficient to prove permanency where
disputed and where such permanency was not apparent from the injury
itself.

Cain, 706 P. 2d at 131.

The Cain court quoted Clifford v.

Opdyke, 383 A.2d 749, 752 (N.J. 1978), wherein it was stated,
The question of the prognosis of an injury and
probable permanent disability is one necessarily within the ambit of expert medical opinion
(except for disabilities which are apparent to
a laymen, such as an amputated body member).
And the burden of proving such permanency by
competent medical testimony rests of course
with plaintiff.
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The court held that a back injury was not such that a lay person
could plainly

see, or infer from the injury, its cause and

permanency.
In the instant action, because plaintiff is not qualified to
render

an

ultimate

medical

opinion

regarding

her

physical

condition, her affidavit stating these assertions was properly
excluded.

Plaintiff's

conclusory

statements that she has a

"disability" as a result of the subject automobile accident is
impermissible under the above-cited

law.

This conclusion by

plaintiff is not a sensory perception as permitted by Rule 701.
Plaintiff's statement that she has suffered a "disability" is a
medical conclusion of which she has neither the skill nor expertise
to make.
Additionally, plaintiff's statement in her affidavit that she
does not have a cardiac disease is equally inadmissible.

Such a

statement is a medical diagnosis for which a lay person is not
competent to testify. The statements pertaining to disability and
cardiac disease are not descriptions of an outward appearance or
perception which may be observed by the senses.

As such, these

statements were properly excluded and did not create an issue of
fact.
Based upon the foregoing, it is evident that the trial court
correctly dismissed plaintiff's complaint under either the standard
applicable to a motion for summary judgment or to a motion to
dismiss.

The facts are undisputed that plaintiff failed to meet
20

the statutory threshold requirements more than five years after the
accident.

Given the factual scenario in the instant action, no

grounds exist upon which to reverse the trial courts dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
RECONSIDER ITS PRIOR DISMISSAL
Utah law is clear that M[t]he trial court has wide discretion
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial . . . ."
Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1983).

Anderson v.

See also Crookston v. Fire

Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657
P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); Alpine Credit Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988
(Utah 1982); Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Amoss
v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1973); Uptown Appliance & Radio Co.
v. Flint, 249 P.2d

826

(Utah 1952).

Additionally, an order

granting or denying a motion for a new trial will not be overturned
absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge.

See

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Barson
by & Through Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah
1984); Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); Schmidt v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981).
Plaintiff seeks a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) and (7).
Plaintiff, however, has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59
for a new trial. Plaintiff failed to address how the evidence was
insufficient to justify dismissal of this action or that the
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dismissal was an error in law.
that

Rather, plaintiff merely claims

"she does not believe that the

court would

reach the

conclusions previously taken after full consideration

of the

evidence before it."
The only new morsel of "evidence" which was not before the
trial court at the time of this determination was plaintiff's
affidavit. However, as previously discussed, plaintiff's affidavit
was properly excluded from consideration.

It is clear that the

evidence before the trial court when it made its initial ruling was
sufficient to justify dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Therefore, plaintiff's request for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) was
properly denied.
Likewise, plaintiff's request for a new trial was properly
denied under Rule 59(a)(7).

Plaintiff failed to identify what

"error in law" was committed by the trial court.

It is clear from

the record that plaintiff, at the time of filing this lawsuit, had
not met the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309.
Plaintiff had neither sustained medical expenses in excess of
$3,000 as required by the statute, nor had she presented any
credible or admissible evidence that she sustained a "permanent
disability" as a result of the subject accident.
Absent meeting the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-309, plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action for
general damages.

No error in law was made by the trial court in

granting defendant's motion to dismiss. The ruling below was well
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grounded by the record before it.

As such, defendant urges this

Court not to overturn that ruling.
Additionally, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was nothing
more than a motion to reconsider which is not allowed under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In her motion for new trial,

plaintiff asked the trial court to "reverse its prior decision."
She "repleads and incorporates her prior argument" set forth in her
memorandum

in

opposition

to

defendant's

motion

to dismiss.

Plaintiff does not add any additional evidence in her motion which
could have any

effect upon the trial Court's prior ruling.

Clearly, plaintiff was asking the Court to "reconsider" its prior
decision.
Utah courts have repeatedly held that a motion to reconsider
is not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah
1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d
42, 44 (Utah App. 1988); McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 980 (Utah
App. 1987); Tracy v. University of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342
(Utah 1980); Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980); Utah
State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1970);
Drurv v. Luncef ord, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966).

The Utah

Supreme Court rationalized against reconsideration of prior rulings
as follows:
If the party ruled against were permitted to
go beyond the rules and obtain a different
ruling upon reconsideration, why should not
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the other party who is now rules against be
permitted to make a motion for re-reconsideration . . . ? Practical expediency demands
that there be some finality to the actions of
the court . . . .
Peay, 607 P. 2d at 843
(citation omitted)
The "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay and
to prevent injustice. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors,
761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App. 1988).

The purpose of the law of the

case doctrine is that in the interest of economy of time and
efficiency of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and
the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings
upon the same propositions in the same case.
omitted)

Id. (citations

Furthermore, it has been repeatedly recognized that the

law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the
case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence
is introduced.

Id. (citations omitted)

In the present case, the law of the case doctrine prohibited
the trial court from reconsidering its prior ruling on defendant's
motion to dismiss. Although plaintiff submitted an affidavit which
was not considered by the trial court in its initial ruling, the
affidavit did not contain any new evidence which could in any
respect effect the Court's prior ruling.

Plaintiff also did not

present any legal theories that were not already considered and
failed to present any new material facts that were not before the
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trial court at the time of the original decision to grant defendant's motion to dismiss.
The trial court had broad discretion to deny plaintiff's
motion for a new trial. Plaintiff failed to make out a sufficient
case for a new trial under Rule 59(a).

She presented no new

evidence which would alter the trial court's prior ruling to
dismiss.

Additionally, she did not provide any explanation as to

how the evidence before the trial court was insufficient or how
there was an error in law.

For these reasons, the trial court

properly denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

There was no

abuse of discretion which could lead this Court to overturn the
trial court's ruling.
POINT III
TRIAL COURT HAD DISCRETION TO DENY ORAL ARGUMENT
Failure of the trial court to grant plaintiff's request for
oral argument on her Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial is
not grounds for reversal of the trial court's ruling. There are no
cases found under Utah law in which failure to grant oral argument
under Rule 4-501(3)(b)&(c) amounts to reversible error. However,
some courts have found that denial of oral argument is discretionary. See New Mexico Feeding Co. v. Keck, 624 P.2d 1012 (N.M. 1981)
(hearing on motion for new trial not required); Belmont Elect.
Serv., Inc. v. Dohrn, 516 P.2d 130 (Colo. App. 1973) (question of
permitting new trial is discretionary; denial of oral argument is
within the sound discretion of the trial court).
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Plaintiff7s reliance on Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P. 2d 1205
(Utah App. 1991) , is inapplicable to the instant action.

In

Gillmor this Court found that the trial court committed reversible
error when it granted Summary Judgment without affording the party
moved against sufficient time to reply. Unlike the instant action,
Gillmor

involved

Administration
motion.

Rule

governing

4-501(1)(b)
the time

of

the

Code

of

in which to respond

Judicial
to the

The Gillmor court held only that Rule 4-501(1) (b) was not

followed. Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, this Court did not
hold that any and all failures to comply with Rule 4-501 amounted
to reversible error.
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration states, in
pertinent part,
(3)

Hearings.

(a) A decision on a motion shall be
rendered without a hearing unless ordered by
the court, or requested by the parties as
provided in Paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a
motion would dispose of the action or any
issues in the action on the merits with
prejudice, either party at the time of filing
the principal memorandum in support of or in
opposition to a motion may file a written
request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless
the court finds that (a) the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b)
that the dispositive issue or set of issues
governing the granting or denial of the motion
has been authoritatively decided.
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Inasmuch as the language of the rule appears to be mandatory
("such request

shall

be

granted"),

the

court

can

exercise

discretion in denying a request for a hearing when it finds that
one of the two enumerated exceptions have been met: (1) the motion
is frivolous or (2) the dispositive issue has been authoritatively
decided.

Although the trial court did not expressly state its

reasoning for denying plaintiffs request for oral argument, it can
be presumed that at least one of the two exceptions were met. Rule
4-501 did not require the trial court to indicate in its memorandum
decision that oral argument was denied because the court found the
position to be frivolous or because the case had been authoritatively decided.
a

reversible

For these reasons, the trial court did not commit
error

in denying

plaintiff's

request

for oral

argument.
POINT IV
TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RECITE FACTUAL
BASIS TO SUPPORT ITS RULINGS
The trial court was not compelled to offer a written statement
for the grounds for its decision because defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial
were based on a single legal theory. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
The Court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56 and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground,
(emphasis added).
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The requirement to provide a written statement pursuant to
Rule 52(a) arises only when the motion is based on "more than one
ground."

Under all other circumstances, no written statement of

the court's ground for decision is required.
The cases relied upon by appellant all contained multiple
grounds

triggering

the

requirement

for

a written

statement.

Therefore, the cases relied upon by appellant do not govern the
resolution of the instant action.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated that "the inclusion of the requirement in Rule 52(a) that
the court shall issue a statement of the ground for its decision
cannot bear upon the undisputed factual basis for the decision
. . . it can only bear upon alternative theories of law that may
apply to the facts." Neerinas v. Utah State Bar, 817 P. 2d 320, 323
(Utah 1991). The requirement of Rule 52(a) provides an instructive
basis for the trial court to inform the litigants of the legal
basis for its decision.

Id.

In Neiderhauser Builders v. Campbellf 824 P. 2d 1193 (Utah App.
1992) , plaintiff filed a claim alleging breach of contract, lien
foreclosure, failure to bond and quantum meruit.

Defendants

counterclaimed,

breach

alleging

contract, and slander.

that

the

lien was

void,

of

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

Upon granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court order addressed only the lien theory.

On appeal it was held

that this was insufficient and that the court should have further
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explained

its rationale

in rejecting plaintiff's theories of

quantum meruit and bonding.
In Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 798
(Utah 1992), defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing,
inter

alia,

that the disputed insurance agreement was unambiguous

and did not violate public policy.

The motion included multiple

legal theories. The court granted the motion, stating simply that
it was doing so for reasons "set forth in the arguments of
defendant."

Allen, 839 P.2d at 800. The Utah Supreme Court held

that although this statement did not comply with Rule 52(a), the
failure to comply alone was not reversible error absent "unusual
circumstances".

Id. at 800-01.

In Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mt. States, Inc.,
844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that the workers covered by employment contracts
that prohibit discharge other than for just cause should not be
able to maintain a tort action for discharge in violation of public
policy; that the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act preempted plaintiff's
common law causes of action; that federal labor law preempted
plaintiff's common law causes of action; and that plaintiff failed
to state tort claims against her former co-workers or to bring
those claims within the period fixed by the relevant statue of
limitations. The trial court provided a blanket statement granting
defendant's motion.

The Court held that because multiple grounds

were presented, this statement did not comply with Rule 52(a).
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Furthermore, failure to state the grounds for its decision
under Rule 52(a) does not constitute reversible error absent
unusual circumstances.

See Retherford, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992);

Allen, 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992); Neerings, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah
1991).

None of these cases involved unusual circumstances and the

courts have not discussed in the abstract what may constitute such
circumstances.
As

demonstrated

from

these

cases,

the

requirement

for

providing a written statement pursuant to Rule 52(a) arises only
when multiple legal theories are presented for review.

In the

present case, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the requirements as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309.

The trial court granted

defendant's motion in its minute entry of December 2, 1992.

In

that minute entry, the court expressly stated that "[t]he matter
fails to reach the threshold level required in 31A-22-309 UCA."
(RA, pp. 106-07)
Defendant's motion was based on only one ground, failure to
meet the statutory requirement.
duty

to

provide

a

written

As such, the trial court had no
statement

as

to

its

decision.

Alternatively, even if it were determined that defendant's motion
constituted more than one ground for dismissal, which defendant
denies, the trial court's statement is sufficient to meet the
requirements of Rule 52(a). The ground specifically articulated by
the trial court in granting the motion to dismiss was plaintiff's
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failure to reach the threshold level required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-309.
In addition to defendant's Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff argues
that the trial court erred in not stating its reason for denying
plaintiff's Motion for Amendment or New Trial. Plaintiff's motion
was brought pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
59(a)(6) & (7) and Rule 52(b).
The differing grounds which plaintiff argues in her motion are
not

differing

theories

legal

theories, but

rather, differing

for the court to consider.

factual

Plaintiff's memorandum

supporting her motion states only that the motion was brought under
Rule 59(a)(6) & (7) "because she does not believe that the Court
would reach the conclusions previously taken after full consideration of the evidence before it." (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Amendment by Rescission or
Order of Dismissal or For New Trial, RA, p. 126).
Plaintiff argues that the affidavits and deposition testimony
of plaintiff and Dr. McGlothlin should have been enough to elicit
a factual argument, thus, precluding the order of dismissal. These
are not the kind of multiple grounds intended to be covered under
Rule

52(a).

See Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W.

Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988) (argument that
affidavits and depositions "clearly establish the injustice that
will be accomplished if said summary judgment is allowed to stand"
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did not constitute

a

"showing" of any of the

circumstances

specified by Rule 59(a)),
Although plaintiff's motion purports to be on the grounds
stated in Rule 59(a)(6), insufficiency of the evidence, or (7),
error in law, she failed to advance any legal argument to support
these theories in her memorandum.

In fact, the memorandum only

included arguments which she attempted to support her contention
that she did, in fact, meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-309. Merely, stating multiple grounds in her motion,
without any support or explanation whatsoever, was insufficient to
trigger Rule 52(a).
Alternatively, if it is determined that plaintiff's motion
constituted multiple grounds, which defendant denies, the trial
court's denial of that motion remains satisfactory.

In the minute

entry of February 1, 1993, the court stated that "[b]ased upon the
record, the court herein denies the request for oral argument and
denies the motion for 'amendment' or 'new trial.'" (RA, p. 181-82)
It can be reasonably concluded that this statement refers to the
fact that there was insufficient evidence and no error in law.
The trial court complied with the requirements set forth in
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

For these reasons, the trial

court did not err in failing to provide a more definite statement
of its reason for granting and denying the respective motions.
Additionally, there are no "unusual circumstances" presented which
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would warrant a reversal of the trial court's rulings. As such, the
ruling of the trial court should not be disturbed.
Notwithstanding the above, plaintiff cannot now appeal any
error which may have been made by the trial court.

Rule 52(b)

provides, in pertinent part,
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court may amend its findings or make
additional findings and may amend the judgment
accordingly, (emphasis added)
Failure to object or move the trial court to correct this oversight
under Rule 52(b), and give the trial court an opportunity to cure
the problem, precludes consideration of the error on appeal.
Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah
App.

1990); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987);

Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984).
In Alford, 791 P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990), the plaintiff sued
for defamation. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that the plaintiff consented to the statements, qualified
privilege, plaintiff's failure to give proper notice under Utah's
Governmental Immunity Act, and absolute privilege.

Alford, 791

P.2d at 2 04. This case clearly involved multiple legal theories as
the basis for the motion.
This Court agreed that the trial court erred in not providing
a

written

statement

delineating

which

alternative

accepted in granting the summary judgment motion.

Id.

theory

it

However,

since plaintiff failed to timely object or move the trial court to
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correct this oversight, which defendant denied any, under Rule
52(b), it was not considered on appeal.
In the present

case, plaintiff

failed

on two different

occasions to make a timely objection to the court7s written statements on the respective motions.

The minute entry prepared in

response to defendant's Motion to Dismiss was made on December 2,
1992.

Plaintiff did not make a Rule 52(b) motion until December

16, 1992, in her Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial, which
was clearly longer than the time permitted under the rule.

As

such, it should not have been considered at that time and certainly
should not be considered now on appeal.
Moreover, the lower court's minute entry in response to
plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial was made on
February 2, 1993. Plaintiff does not again raise any objection to
the form of this order until her brief appealing the final order of
dismissal and order denying amendment of order or new trial. This
brief was not filed until May 14, 1993, over three months after the
decision of the trial court.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the

objection is incorporated into plaintiff's Notice of Appeal, that
objection was not made until March 11, 1993.

Under either alter-

native, the time period for objecting to the form of the order had
long passed.
In summary, the trial court did not err in not providing a
fuller explanation of its reasons for granting and denying the
respective motions.

Only one legal theory was at issue in both
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situations. Alternatively, even if it is determined that more that
one legal theory was present, the trial court's reasoning was
sufficient

under Rule

52(a),

The rule does not

state the

extensiveness of the explanation, only that one be made. This was
fulfilled in both minute entries.
Lastly, plaintiff did not timely object to the form of either
minute entry made by the trial court.

Any objections were made

well after the 10 day limitation period under Rule 52(b). Even if
this Court makes a determination that the trial court's minute
entries were insufficient, plaintiff cannot now make such an
objection.
CONCLUSION
Defendant-Appellee respectfully requests this Court to affirm
the lower court's Order of Dismissal and Order Denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Amendment of Order or New Trial and Request for Oral
Argument.

_
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